Daniel Hannan writes an interesting piece regarding the current legal action brought by a number of Christians against their employers, which I largely agree with.

As a general principle, the relationship between the employer and the employee should be a matter between the two parties and covered by an agreed contract. Therefore, if the employer wishes to lay down a strict code of dress, which prohibits the wearing of a cross, then he can. However, this relationship has long since ceased to be a private matter. The state has muscled in and laid down numerous regulations, and virtually no employer would dare to demand of a Sikh, a Muslim, a Jew or a Hindu that they should remove an item of clothing or jewelry which pertained to their religious affiliation, so it is only natural that Christians will take umbrage when they are subject to such restrictions and their co-workers are not.

The kind of ‘group rights’ arguments involved in such matters do not generally solicit support from libertarians. In contrast, we uphold individual liberty for everyone. Whatever rights can legitimately be claimed due to one’s membership of a group derive from one’s individuality. This does not mean that particular groups of individuals should not band together to better fight their individual battles, but, if taken too far, as has happened with a great deal of ‘Human Rights’ legislation, this can become divisive. When the BNP demand ‘rights for whites’, they are only following a logical path set down by these interfering laws.

So, given the likelihood (as I see it) that the courts will rule in favour of the employers with regard to the current case, that, as the government lawyers have it, if the employee doesn’t like it, they can get themselves another job, and also given the fact that most libertarians will, I expect, agree with that ruling on the grounds of their support for the employer’s freedom to contract, what course of action can a libertarian suggest to these Christians?

There is always the boycott. As described in Murray Rothbard’s “The Ethics of Liberty”:

A boycott is an attempt to persuade other people to have nothing to do with some particular person or firm — either socially or in agreeing not to purchase the firm’s product. Morally a boycott may be used for absurd, reprehensible, laudatory, or neutral goals. It may be used, for example, to attempt to persuade people not to buy non-union grapes or not to buy union grapes. From our point of view, the important thing about the boycott is that it is purely voluntary, an act of attempted persuasion, and therefore that it is a perfectly legal and licit instrument of action.

Again, as in the case of libel, a boycott may well diminish a firm’s customers and therefore cut into its property values; but such an act is still a perfectly legitimate exercise of free speech and property rights. Whether we wish any particular boycott well or ill depends on our moral values and on our attitudes toward the concrete goal or activity. But a boycott is legitimate per se. If we feel a given boycott to be morally reprehensible, then it is within the rights of those who feel this way to organize a counter-boycott to persuade the consumers otherwise, or to boycott the boycotters. All this is part of the process of dissemination of information and opinion within the framework of the rights of private property.

So, if British Airways, for instance, wish to prohibit their Christian staff from displaying a cross, and this is within their rights to do so, Christians are certainly within their rights to boycott the company and take their custom elsewhere. This has been the case, although I don’t know to what extent it has continued over the years since the dispute began in 2006, or whether BA has paid any attention.

Other parts of the case relate to state employees, such as a registrar not wishing to conduct civil partnerships. Likewise, Christians may wish to consider boycotting the state, refusing to pay taxes etc.  Whether or not this leads to a successful result, it will be sure to solicit a reaction.